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COMMENTS

VISUAL ARTISTS' MORAL RIGHTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
OVERLOOKED NEED FOR STATES TO TAKE
ACTION
Laura Nakashima*

I. INTRODUCTION

Andy Warhol once said, "In the future everyone will be
famous for fifteen minutes."' Yet in the case of artists such as
Warhol, the fame lingers much longer, for their reputations
are directly tied to the works of art they create and share
with the world. The doctrine of moral rights recognizes that
artists invest a part of themselves in the works they create,
and as such, certain acts against the artists or their work
jeopardize the artists' reputation.2 The doctrine realizes that
allowing such acts to occur produces disincentives for artists
to create, which harms the society that is then deprived of the
artists' creations.3
Andy Warhol illustrates the point. One of his most
famous paintings depicts nothing more than a can of
Campbell's tomato soup.' Some perceive the painting as a
masterful piece of fine art, while others find the painting
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 41. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.A., University of California, Santa
Barbara.
1. ANDY WARHOL, THE ANDY WARHOL DIARIES 156 (Pat Hackett ed.,
1989).
2. See Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law
of Artists, Authors and Creators,53 HARv. L. REV. 554 (1940).
3. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915,
6915-16.
4. Titled Campbell's Soup Can (1964), this painting is located in the Leo
Castelli Gallery, New York.
Its copyright holder is the Andy Warhol
Foundation for the Visual Arts/Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York.
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unremarkable. However, for reasons personal to Warhol, he
felt compelled to create this painting and craft it in such a
way that he was proud enough to share it with the public.
Now suppose this painting was sold, and the new owner
decided to alter it by adding the words, "Fat Free." The
doctrine of moral rights recognizes that such an alteration
would violate the integrity of the artist's work.5 Thus, the
doctrine of moral rights maintains that Warhol, as the artist,
should control the portrayal of his work since it is a direct
reflection of his personality
In contrast to copyright laws, which seek to protect
economic rights, the doctrine of moral rights seeks to protect
the artists' personality rights in their works Whereas many
countries have long protected artists' moral rights in
compliance with their membership in the Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,8 the United
States only recently joined the Convention on March 1, 1989
because of its longstanding difficulties in recognizing artists'
The difficulties stemmed from balancing
moral rights
varying interests with Congress trying to protect artists'
moral rights without interfering with the American copyright
system.' °
While Congress struggled with this careful balance, some
states took the initiative to protect artists' moral rights by
passing their own statutes." Nonetheless, some criticized
5. See Roeder, supra note 2.
6. See id.
7. See generally Paul Geller, Comments on Possible U.S. Compliance with
Article 6bis of the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 665, 678
(1986) (explaining how U.S. copyright law provides economic incentives to
creators to share their works, yet how "once the threshold is crossed" and the
work is before the public, it is unclear as to what extent an author's privacy
interest in controlling the form in which his work reaches the public should be).
8. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
9. See Roeder, supra note 2, at 557-58; see also Russ VerSteeg, Federal
Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract Theory and Analysis, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 827, 830 (1992).
10. See infra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
11. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-116s-116t (West 1958 & Supp. 2000); 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
320/1-8 (West 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2154-5126 (West 1987); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §
85S (West Supp. 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24A-1 to -8 (West 1987); N.M.

STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4B-1 to -3 (Michie 1997); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§
14.01-14.03 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1999); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2101-
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these state statutes as inadequate protection for artists and
urged Congress to pass a federal law that would provide
uniformity in the states' patchwork of protections and better
comply with the more protective standards of the Berne
Convention."2
Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
("VARA") as its supposed answer to these requests."
However, VARA's application is extremely limited and, in
many respects, more restricted than some of the state
statutes. 14 In fact, in the more than nine years since VARA's
passage, VARA has produced only a single, clear-cut victory
for artists. 5 This leads to the questions: can state statutes
better protect artists' moral rights by supplementing VARA,
and if so, should more states pass such statutes?
This comment analyzes VARA's narrow application and
examines whether it would be better to protect artists' moral
rights through state statutes that would supplement the
protections granted under VARA. VARA's shortcomings are
not highlighted for the purpose of suggesting its outright
failure or urging more comprehensive federal protections;
rather, they are used to establish that VARA provides artists
with a minimum threshold of protection, and to emphasize
the importance that state statutes play in strengthening this
protection. In Part II, this comment reviews the background
of the doctrine of moral rights. 6 It begins with the history of
moral rights and how it evolved in the United States, 7
continues with an account of the moral rights protections in
the United States, and then summarizes three major cases
that have been brought under VARA. 9 Part III questions
whether state statutes can better protect artists' moral rights
by supplementing VARA protections, and if so, whether more
2110 (West 1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 42-75.2.1-10 (1998).
12. See Jack A. Cline, Note Moral Rights: The Long and Winding Road
Toward Recognition, 14 NOVA L. REV. 435 (1990); Edward J. Damich, State
"MoralRights" Statutes: An Analysis and Critique, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
291 (1989).
13. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990).
14. See infra Part IV.
15. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
16. See infra Part II.A-C.
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. See infra Part II.C.
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states should enact such statutes.0
Part IV uses a
hypothetical to compare VARA and the California Art
Preservation Act of 19791 in order to demonstrate VARA's
limitations, as well as to illustrate how states may offset such
limitations and better protect artists' moral rights. 2 Finally,
Part V suggests ways in which state statutes may supplement
VARA, 3 and Part VI concludes by re-emphasizing the
necessity of such state statutes. 4
II. BACKGROUND

A. History
The doctrine of moral rights originated in France as the
civil law doctrine of "droit moral., 5 Droit moral protects
artists ' personality rights in their works of art based on the
belief that an artist's personality is embodied in, and
inseparable from, her work of art. 7 As an artist creates,
"[s]he projects into the world part of [her] personality and
subjects it to the ravages of public use." 8 Thus, injuring an
artist's work of art also injures her reputation."
Many countries have long protected artists' moral rights
in compliance with their membership in the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works
("Berne Convention"),"0 which has afforded comprehensive
moral rights protection to authors since 1928."' However, the
United States resisted joining the Berne Convention for over
a hundred years, in large part due to its difficulties in
meeting the requirements of Article 6bis which requires
20. See infra Part III.
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
22. See infra Part IV.
23. See infra Part V.
24. See infra Part VI.
25. See supra note 2.
26. Because the law analyzed in this comment only protects visual artists,
the term "artists" is used throughout. However, note that the doctrine of droit
moral protects all authors and creators.
27. See John Henry Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1025 (1976).
28. Roeder, supra note 2, at 557.
29. See id.
30. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
31. Roeder, supra note 2, at 557.

20001

VISUAL ARTISTS" MORAL RIGHTS

207

member countries to recognize moral rights. 2 Specifically,
Article 6bis provides:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and
even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall
have the right to claim authorship of the work and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification
of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work,
which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with
the preceding paragraph shall, after his death, be
maintained, at least until the expiration of the economic
rights ....
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights
granted by this Article shall be governed by the legislation
of the country where protection is claimed. 3
As one early scholar of moral rights noted, "[algitation to
revise our copyright law so as to make the United States
eligible for membership [was] constant and powerful."34
Congress strained to balance a multitude of different
interests, 5 seeking to protect "the legitimate interests of
visual artists without inhibiting the rights of copyright
owners and users, and without undue interference with the
successful operation of the American copyright system.""
Some argued that moral rights would hinder the production
and distribution of copyrighted works, 7 while others feared
that moral rights for authors would force editors to obtain
prior approval of all revisions by authors.8 These and other
issues spurred extensive debate, which provided an
32. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
33. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
March 20, 1914, U.S., art. 6bis, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27 (1986).
34. Roeder, supra note 2, at 557.
35. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514; see also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright
and the Moral Right: Is An American MarriagePossible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1
(1985); see also Vera Zlatarski, "Moral"Rights and Other Moral Interests:Public
Art Law in France, Russia, and the United States, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS
201, 215-16 (1999) (commending the United States' pragmatic approach in
protecting multiple interests).
36. H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 10. See also Robert A. Gorman, Federal
Moral Rights Legislation: The Need for Caution, 14 NOVA L. REV. 421, 428
(1990) (discussing other conflicting legal principles such as public domain,
property law, contract law, and the judicial role).
37. See Russ VerSteeg, Federal Moral Rights for Visual Artists: Contract
Theory and Analysis, 67 WASH. L. REV. 827, 830 (1992).
38. See id.
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enlightening backdrop to the circumstances surrounding and
leading up to the United States' membership in the Berne
Convention. 9
On March 1, 1989, the United States joined the Berne
Convention.4 ° The Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group
on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention4 ' reported that
the totality of existing United States law sufficiently complied
with Article 6bis, even absent a federal statute."2 The totality
of existing law consisted of state statutes that protected
moral rights, as well as existing copyright, trademark,
contract, and tort law.' Congress agreed with the Working
Group's report, particularly after comparing its laws with
those of other Berne member countries, and entered the
United States into the Berne Convention." Some criticized
Congress's "minimalist approach," citing Congress's desire to
"attain the maximum benefits that adherence to Berne could
bring while shouldering the minimum burdens. '
However, one year later Congress passed the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA"), 8 despite its earlier
conviction that existing federal and state law adequately
protected artists' moral rights to the standard of Article
6bis."7 In enacting VARA, Congress sought to strengthen its
commitment to the Berne Convention 8 and to provide
uniformity to national copyright laws, believing that a
uniform, federal law would more effectively stimulate artists'
39. For a detailed account of the moral rights adoption in the United States,
see Gerald Dworkin, The Moral Right of the Author: Moral Rights and the
Common Law Countries, 19 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 229, 239-42 (1995).
40. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102
Stat. 2853 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also
Damich, supra note 12, at 292 (explaining that although the United States'
adherence to the Berne Convention made major changes to U.S. copyright law,
the United States did not enact federal legislation in order to conform to Article
6bis).
41. Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 547-57 (1986).
42. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568,
102 Stat. 2853 § 3(a), (b) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
43. See supra note 40.
44. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
45. VerSteeg, supra note 37, at 832.
46. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(1990).
47. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
48. See 136 CONG. REc. 36,948 (1990).

2000]

VISUAL ARTISTS' MORAL RIGHTS

209

creativity.4 9 Consistent with France's rationale underlying
droit moral," Congress recognized the benefit to the general
public in protecting artists' moral rights. As stated in the
House Reports, "[airtists play a very important role in
capturing the essence of culture and recording it for future
generations. It is often through art that we are able to see
truths, both beautiful and ugly."5
With the passage of VARA, the current issues
surrounding moral rights extend past whether the United
States should recognize moral rights and instead focus on
how to best recognize moral rights and balance the many
competing interests." As one scholar in 1989 recognized in
witnessing the United States' adherence to the Berne
Convention and the growth of state moral rights statutes,
"moral rights protection is an 'idea whose time has come."'' 3
B. Moral Rights Protectionsin the United States
1. Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("VARA")
VARA serves to protect the reputation of certain visual
Its
artists and the reputation of their works of art.54
application is limited to "works of visual art," narrowly
defined as:
(1) a painting, drawing, print, or sculpture, existing in a
single copy, in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that
are signed and consecutively numbered by the author, or,
in the case of a sculpture, in multiple cast, carved, or
fabricated sculptures of 200 or fewer that are
consecutively numbered by the author and bear the
signature or other identifying mark of the author; or
(2)

a still photographic image produced for exhibition

49. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 21 n.54, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6931 n.54.
50. See Roeder, supra note 2, at 554-55.
51. H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 6 (statement of Representative Markey at the
Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary on June 20, 1989), reprintedin
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
52. See Damich, supra note 12, at 296.
53. Damich, supra note 12, at 296.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514, at 5, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
See generally Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward
a FederalSystem of Moral Rights Protectionfor Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV.
945 (1990) (analyzing VARA in detail).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

210

[Vol. 41

purposes only, existing in a single copy that is signed by
the author, or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer
that are signed and consecutively numbered by the
author.55
It is important to recognize that this definition is not
synonymous with any other definition in the Copyright Act,56
which is precisely what Congress intended." As emphasized
in the legislative history, "[We] would like to stress that we
have gone to extreme lengths to very narrowly define the
works of art that will be covered .... [Tihis legislation covers
only a very select group of artists."58 Works excluded from
protection include, among other things, works for hire,
posters, charts, motion pictures and other audiovisual works,
merchandising items, and advertising or promotional
materials. 9
VARA grants artists: (1) the right of attribution, ° which
allows them to claim authorship in their work and to prevent
misattribution of their work;6 and (2) the right of integrity,"
which allows them to protect their works against
modifications and destructions that are prejudicial to their
64
honor or reputations.63 These rights vest solely in the artist.
They are distinct from the exclusive ownership rights 65 and
may be waived,66 but may not be transferred. A valid waiver
must be in writing, specifically identifying the work and the
uses of that work, and be signed by the artist.6 8
Not considered a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification protected by VARA, are modifications that result
from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials. 9 Further, in respect of the current practices of the
55. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996 & Supp. 2000).
56. See id.
57. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-514, at 11 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6915, 6921.
58. Id. (statement of Representative Markey).

59. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. § 106A(a)(1).
id.
id. § 106A(a)(2)-(3).
id.
id. § 106A(b).
17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(2) (1996 & Supp. 2000).
id. § 106A(e).
id.
id. § 106A(e)(1).
id. § 106A(c)(1).
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artistic community, modifications that result from
conservation or public presentation of the work, including
lighting and placement (unless caused by gross negligence),
are also not considered a distortion, mutilation, or other
modification."
Finally, any reproduction, depiction,
portrayal, or other use of a work is also not deemed a
distortion, mutilation, or other modification."v
In contrast to the moral rights in Article 6bis of the
Berne Convention that endure after the artist's death at least
until the expiration of the economic rights,72 the rights
granted by VARA only last for the life of the artist.73 This is
also in contrast to the duration of economic rights granted
under the Copyright Act, which last for the life of the artist
plus fifty years." While the House bill extended the duration
to the term applied to economic rights, the life of the artist
plus fifty years," the Senate deliberately shortened the
duration to the life of the artist." In doing so, the Senate
cited the existence of state statutes that extended the
duration of rights to the life of the artist plus fifty years,
claiming that these state statutes enabled the United States
to comply with the Berne Convention.77
VARA applies to works created before its effective date of
June 1, 1991, so long as the title to such work has not been
transferred from the artist as of VARA's effective date."
VARA also applies to works created after its effective date,
but does not include any destruction, distortion, mutilation,
or other modification of a work that occurred before the
effective date.79
VARA preempts all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of its rights."0 However, VARA does not
preempt: (1) any cause of action commenced before VARA's
70. See id. § 106A(c)(2).
71. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) (1996 & Supp. 2000).

72. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
supra note 33, at 5.
73. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1).

74. See id. §§ 302-303.
75. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
76. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).
77. See id.

78. See Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5132 (1990).
79. See id.

80. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(f)(1).
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effective date;" (2) rights that are not equivalent to VARA
rights; 2 and (3) rights that extend beyond the artist's life.83 It
is important to note that the Senate narrowed the reach of
VARA's preemption power to ensure that it would not
preempt certain portions of state statutes.84 Specifically, the
Senate believed that in light of its limitation on the duration
of rights afforded by VARA, it was "necessary" to restrict the
reach of VARA's preemption power in order to ensure
compatibility with the Berne Convention. 8 Simply stated, the
Senate sought to ensure that the state and common law
rights that survive the death of the artist were not preempted
by VARA.8" However, the preemption power of VARA has not
yet been tested.
Remedies under VARA mirror those provided under the
Copyright Act with the sole exception of criminal offenses.
Thus, an artist who wins a VARA claim may generally obtain
an injunction,88 obtain damages,89 and recover costs and
attorneys' fees.9"
Finally, it is important to recognize that although VARA
marks a major advance for American artists, commentators
stress that it still does not bring United States law into
compliance with Article 6bis of the Berne Convention. 9' They
point to, among other considerations, VARA's limited scope of
works protected, the limited artists' rights protected, and the
limited duration of the rights granted.
2. State Statutes
State statutes have played a dualist role in the history of
moral rights in the United States. At times they have been
criticized for their inability to substantially protect artists'
moral rights," with some going so far as to discourage their
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. § 301(f)(2)(A).
id. § 301(f)(2)(B).
id. § 301(f)(2)(C).
136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).
id.
id.
17 U.S.C. § 506(f) (1996 & Supp. 2000).
id. § 502.
id. § 504.
id. § 505.
Damich, supra note 12, at 292.
id. at 293.
Cline, supra note 12; see also Damich, supra note 12.
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enactment altogether.9 4 At other times they have played a
critical role in recognizing moral rights in the United States,
with some lauding them as the strongest protection of United
States law in meeting the standards of Article 6bis, which
enabled the United States to join the Berne Convention.9 5
Prior to the enactment of VARA, eleven states had
already adopted their own laws protecting artists' moral
rights. 6 California enacted the California Art Preservation
Act of 1979 ("California Act"), making it the first law in the
United States that specifically protected artists' moral
rights.9 7 This and other state laws were seen by some as
merely "applying first aid to a wound that needs a
Congressional transplant," 98 which explains in part why more
states failed to pass moral rights legislation.9
Other
criticisms which explain why a greater number of states
failed to pass laws protecting artists' moral rights include: (1)
state statutes recognizing moral rights in a limited class of
works (only visual & graphic arts); 0 (2) the undermining
effect that the qualifications placed on the rights of respect
and attribution played;'
(3) the complete waivability of
moral rights defeating the purpose of the statutes; 92 and (4)
the question of whether state statutes can exist at all due to
preemption. 3 Critics also cited the "predictable failure of
state legislation as the source of artist protection" on
fundamental questions involving Constitutional attacks and
the need for uniformity.0 4 These and other criticisms led
some to advise states without statutes protecting artists'
moral rights to simply "do nothing."'
These criticisms must be kept in context, for they were
made before VARA's enactment and primarily used to urge
the enactment of federal legislation, demonstrating that state
94. See Cline, supra note 12, at 448.

95. Compare VerSteeg, supra note 9, at 833. ("Of the four prongs that were
supposed to make United States law equivalent to Article 6bis, the state
legislation was probably the strongest.").
96. See supra note 11.

97. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
98. Cline, supra note 12, at 448.
99. See generally Damich, supra note 12, at 293.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

See
See
See
See
See

id.
id.
id.
id.
Cline, supra note 12, at 448-50.

105. Id. at 448.
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laws alone were insufficient to protect artists' moral rights.

°6

Thus, despite the criticisms that state statutes have faced,
their importance cannot be minimized or overlooked. In
asserting its adherence to Article 6bis of the Berne
Convention, Congress expressly pointed to state statutes as
part of its justification that American law met the standards
required by the Article." 7 As mentioned above, the Senate
cited the "necessity" of state statutes in ensuring the United
States' compliance with the Berne Convention regarding
duration of artists' moral rights in enacting VARA.' 8
Furthermore, state statutes formed the basis for federal
legislation, including the bill that eventually became codified
into VARA.' 09
Since VARA's enactment in 1990 only three states have
subsequently passed moral rights statutes,"' bringing the
number of states that currently have laws protecting artists'
moral rights to fourteen."' While a detailed, comparative
analysis of the different state statutes is beyond the scope of
this comment,'12 certain points should be highlighted. A
recent article neatly grouped the existing state statutes into
three categories."'
The first category includes state statutes aimed at
protecting different interests, including the artist's
personality interest, the artist's interest in her reputation,
and the public's interest in the preservation of art."'
Included in this category are the laws of California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode
Island."' For example, under the California Act," 6 artists'
rights endure for the life of the artist plus fifty years and are
enforceable by the artists' heirs, legatees, or personal
106. See Cline, supra note 12; see also Damich, supra note 12.
107. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).

108. See id.
109. See Cline, supra note 12, at 444 n.90 (statement of Senator Kennedy
that the California and Massachusetts moral rights statutes formed the basis
for the federal legislation).
110. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.720 (Michie 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. §
9-6-409 (1996); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-22-16 (Michie 1992).
111. See supra notes 11, 110.
112. For a detailed analysis comparing the state statutes, see Damich, supra
note 12, Zlatarski, supra note 35, at 215-19.
113. See Zlatarski, supra note 35, at 217-20.
114. See id. at 217-18.
115. See id. at 218.
116. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
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representatives.11 7 Artists may also obtain punitive damages
that, if granted, are paid to an organization involved in
charitable or educational activities pertaining to fine arts."8
The Massachusetts statute has been recognized as the most
comprehensive in terms of works protected, even protecting
motion pictures, which many states do not protect." 9
Accordingly, these state statutes afford the artist and the
public greater protections.
The second category includes state statutes with the
20
narrower objective of protecting the artist's reputation.
Arguably, these statutes do not provide artists with powerful
moral rights protection.'
For example, the rights protected
under the 1983 New York Artists' Authorship Act only endure
for the life of the artist. 12 Included in this category are the
laws of New York, Louisiana, Maine, and New Jersey.'
The last category includes state statutes with even more
limited moral rights protection for artists. 4 Included in this
category are the laws of Illinois, Nevada, New Mexico, South
Dakota, and Utah.12 ' Interestingly, the three state statutes
26
passed after VARA's enactment fall into this category.
Perhaps one of the greatest uncertainties now associated
with state statutes protecting artists' moral rights deals with
the issue of preemption.'2 7 As mentioned above, VARA's
preemption power over state statutes has not yet been tested.
In the landmark case of Goldstein v. California,128 the Court
extensively examined the history of federal copyright
legislation and found that Congress "evidenced no intent
either expressly or implicitly to occupy the entire copyright
field and bar the states from exercising concurrent power." 2 9
Whether this rationale applies to the area of artists' moral
117. See id. § 987(g)(1).
118. See id. § 987(e)(3).
119. See Damich, supra note 12, at 298-99.
120. See Zlatarski, supra note 35, at 218-19.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 218.
123. See id. at 220.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See supra note 110.
127. See generally Kwall, supra note 35.
128. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
129. Karen Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the
CaliforniaArt PreservationAct as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 873, 894 (1981) (citing Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. at 570 (1973)).
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rights remains to be seen. However, the same commentators
who have noted VARA's shortcomings have advised that
VARA's preemption provision "be given a narrow reading to
allow the more expansive protections of state moral rights
statutes to continue to bring American law closer to the
requirements of [Airticle 6bis."'3°
The legislative history further illustrates this point.
Whereas the House supported a strong, uniform Federal law
and "the concomitant preemption of State law where
appropriate,"3 ' the Senate narrowed VARA's preemption
power to ensure that state laws were free to extend protection
for artists' moral rights beyond those provided for in VARA
and thereby ensure the United States' continued compliance
In doing so, the Senate
with the Berne Convention.'
expressly stated that, "Congress does not intend to preempt
section 989 of the California Civil Code, the 'cultural heritage
protection,' or any other similar State code." 33
3. Other Protections
Particularly before VARA's enactment, artists, attorneys,
and judges alike creatively utilized other protections in
protecting artists' moral rights." For example, the plaintiffs
in Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co. successfully used
section 43 of the Lanham Trademark Act to convince the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that they should have
their work attributed to them in the form in which they
created it."5 Other grounds used by plaintiffs have included
libel

6

and rights of privacy or publicity.17

However, an

analysis of these protections is beyond the scope of this
comment.
C. Case Law Under VARA
A number of cases have been brought under VARA.
However, the majority of those cases were resolved with little

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Damich, supra note 12, at 947-48.
H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).
Id. (emphasis added).
See generally Kwall, supra note 35.
See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
See generally Kwall, supra note 35.
See generally id.
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or no interpretation of VARA." 8 In many cases, the courts
found VARA inapplicable because the plaintiffs work did not
constitute a "work of visual art.""9 These cases provide little
insight into the application of VARA, yet they reflect precisely

the narrow scope of protection that Congress intended to
afford artists in enacting VARA.
VARA was first applied in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc." The district court enjoined removal or destruction of

the plaintiffs sculpture that was in the lobby of defendants'

commercial building. "'
The court rejected the defendants'
claim that the sculpture was a work-for-hire,"' excluded
under VARA, and instead found that the plaintiffs were
independent contractors."" Finding the sculpture to be of
"recognized stature," the court prohibited its destruction

during the lifetime of the plaintiffs.'" The district court also
upheld VARA against the defendant's arguments that it was
unconstitutional under the takings clause 5 and that it
substantially diminished the value of defendant's property." 6
However, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that the plaintiffs sculpture was a work-for-hire and that,
therefore, VARA could not apply. "7 Nonetheless, the court of
appeals
all other holdings of the district court, " " so
althoughupheld
the plaintiffs
in Carter did not fall under the
138. See, e.g., Shaw v. Rizzoli Int'l. Publications, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 4259
(JGK), 1999 WL 160084 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 1999) (VARA was one of the
plaintiffs ten claims filed and this claim was dismissed); English v. BFC & R
East 11th Street, No. 97 CIV. 7446 (HB), 1997 WL 746444 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 3,
1997) (finding VARA inapplicable to artworks that are illegally placed on
another's property without consent when that artwork cannot be removed from
the site in question); Kaplan v. Lily of France, No. 95 CIV. 1046 (SHS) (THK),
1996 WL 297088 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 1996) (resolving issues on the state claims
because the plaintiff inadequately pleaded a VARA claim); Gegenhuber v.
Hystopolis Prods., Inc., No. 92 C 1055, 1992 WL 168836 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 13, 1992)
(using VARA to remove the case t6 federal court in an attempt to preempt the
plaintiffs state claims).
139. See, e.g., Lee v. A.R.T. Co., 125 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1997) (note cards);
English v. BFC & R East 11th Street, 1997 WL 746444 (S.D.N.Y.) (illegally
painted murals).
140. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
141. See id. at 77.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id.
146. See id. at 88.
146. See Carter,71 F.3d at 80.
147. See id. at 77.
148. See id.
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umbrella of VARA's protection, the case was important in
establishing several tests that have been subsequently
49
applied in cases brought under VARA.'
The plaintiff in Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas
Associates5 asked the Southern District Court of New York
to again consider VARA. The plaintiff, a professional artist
and sculptor, brought an action against the defendants for
improperly displaying and mutilating his artwork in violation
5
of VARA and the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law.' '
The plaintiff claimed that the improper display of his
sculpture damaged his honor and reputation as an artist.'
The court found that the plaintiffs sculpture fell within
the category of works protected under VARA and the New
5
Citing section
York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law. '
that the
found
also
court
district
the
VARA,
of
610(b)(2)
protection
VARA's
from
excluded
not
was
plaintiffs sculpture
because it was created prior to VARA's effective date and the
However, the
plaintiff had retained title to the sculpture.'
because the
claims
VARA
plaintiff's
the
court barred
VARA's
before
occurred
defendant's improper display
5
effective date."
The district court recognized that the improper display of
the plaintiffs sculpture could be interpreted as occurring
after VARA's effective date since the improper display was
continuous.'56 In examining the legislative history, the court
concluded that "'distortion, mutilation, and modification',
regardless of any possible broader meaning in the general
context of the statute, does not arise from continued display
for the purposes of applying section 610(b)(2), and the acts
alleged by [plaintiffi do not give rise to any rights under

VARA."9157

Since the court barred the VARA claims, it did not need
to reach the issue of whether VARA preempted the New York
149. This case analyzed, in detail, the work-for-hire test and established a
two-prong test to determine whether a work of visual art is one of "recognized
stature." See id.
150. 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
151. See id.
152. See id. at 624.
153. See id. at 624-25, 627.
154. See id. at 626-27.
155. See id. at 628-29.
156. Pavia, 901 F. Supp. 620, 628-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
157. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
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Arts and Cultural Affairs Law.'58 It did, however, note that
"whether the rights conferred by VARA are equivalent to
those of [the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law] 'will
occupy courts for years to come .... """
Despite his VARA claims being dismissed, the plaintiffs
claims under the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law
were upheld. 6 ° The court found that a new cause of action
accrued each day that the piece was improperly displayed. 6 '
Martin v.

City of Indianapolis,6 2 the

most

recent

application of VARA, marks the "first clear-cut winner under
VARA, resulting in summary judgment [for the artist]. " 163

The plaintiff, Jan Martin, created a steel sculpture on a plot
of land that was later sold to the defendant, the City of
Indianapolis, as part of an urban renewal plan.'
Before
Martin began creating the sculpture he obtained approval
6
from the City, at which time he signed a project agreement."
The project agreement provided that if the sculpture was
determined to no longer be compatible with the surrounding
land use or if the property was acquired as part of the urban
renewal plan, Martin would receive a written notice giving
him ninety days to remove the sculpture.' 6 However, without

giving Martin any prior notice, the City demolished the
sculpture, and Martin brought suit. 6'
Using the test established in Carter v. Helmsley-Spear,
Inc., 8 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
determined that the plaintiffs work was a work of
"recognized stature."'69 The court also dismissed the City's
claim that Martin had waived his VARA rights in the project
agreement.'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
confirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of
158. See id. at 626-27.
159. Id. at 626 (citing Charles Ossola, Law for Art's Sake, THE RECORDER,
Jan. 8, 1991, at 6).
160. See id. at 620.
161. See id. at 625-26.
162. 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
163. Craig D. Feiser, This 'Symphony' Is Finished, 85 A.B.A. J. 38 (Dec.,
1999) (citing a statement by Scott Hodes, attorney for plaintiff).
164. See Martin, 192 F.3d at 610-11.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. 71 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 1995).
169. See Martin, 192 F.3d at 612-13.
170. See id. at 613-14.
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Martin.'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
For many years there was pressure for Congress to enact
federal law protecting artists' moral rights.' When Congress
finally did enact such a law, VARA, it purposely narrowed its
application in order to balance the many competing interests
Yet in over
surrounding the recognition of moral rights.'
nine years since its enactment, VARA has produced only a
single, clear-cut victory for artists, and in that case, it was
brought only after the artist's work had already been
destroyed. 4 Thus, case law confirms VARA's constricted
application 5 and raises the questions: can state statutes
better protect artists' moral rights by supplementing VARA,
and if so, should more states pass such statutes?
IV. ANALYSIS

Recall that the artist in Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the
Americas Associates'76 brought suit under the New York Arts
and Cultural Affairs Law and VARA,

77

yet because the

improper display of the artist's work occurred before VARA's
The artist recovered
effective date, VARA could not apply.'
solely under New York's statute protecting artists' moral
rights.9 Had the events of Pavia occurred in a state without
a statute protecting artists' moral rights, such as Indiana, the
artist would have had no valid claim or recompense for the
improper display of his sculpture. Alternatively, the artist in
Martin v. City of Indianapolis8° brought suit and recovered
solely under VARA because the state of Indiana had no law
protecting artists' moral rights.'8' Had the demolition of the
artist's sculpture in Martin occurred in a state with a statute
protecting artists' moral rights, such as California, the artist
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 609.
See supra note 33.
See H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
See supra Part II.C.
901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
See id.
See id.
See id.
192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
See id.
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would have recovered greater damages than those allowed by
VARA. Together these cases illustrate the importance that
state statutes play and can further play, respectively, in
protecting artists' moral rights in connection with VARA. To
further demonstrate this point, consider the following
hypothetical.
It is the year 2000 and Artist Anne is a struggling
painter who is making a name for herself in the art
community. She sells her paintings at local art fairs
throughout the state of California and believes that one of her
paintings, entitled, "The Sea," will be well-received, so she
creates 225 copies.
She signs them, but does not
consecutively number them. As expected, Artist Anne
immediately sells all 225 copies. In fact, "The Sea" brings
Artist Anne critical acclaim and success.
A local university purchases and displays one copy of
"The Sea," which after many years of public display is badly
dirtied. In the process of cleaning the painting, the university
negligently punctures and rips it. However, due to the
popularity of "The Sea" and the publicity associated with
displaying a piece by Artist Anne, the university decides to
display the painting in its damaged state. Artist Anne has
since died and her heirs seek to enjoin the university's
continued display of "The Sea" and to recover damages. They
file suit in federal court under a VARA claim and a claim
under the California Act.
A.

Durationand Standing
The rights granted under VARA vest solely in the artist
and terminate upon the artist's death.18 In limiting the
duration of VARA's protected rights to the life of the artist,
Congress cited the existence of state statutes that extended
the duration of rights to the life of the artist plus fifty years,
and claimed that these state statutes enabled the United
States to comply with the Berne Convention. 3 In doing so,
Congress conceded VARA's lack of compliance with the Berne
Convention in the area of duration of rights and also
recognized the necessity of state statutes."" Congress further
asserted that states may extend the duration of moral rights
182. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b), (d) (1996).
183. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
184. See id.
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protection beyond that granted in VARA, and that such
provisions of state statutes would not be preempted."' This is
particularly important to recognize in light of case law that
demonstrates defendants utilizing VARA as a means of
preempting and defeating artists' state-based claims.'86
The California Act is one of the state statutes that
extends the duration of its rights granted until the fiftieth
anniversary of the artist's death.8 7 It also expressly provides
that if the artist is deceased, her heir, beneficiary, devisee, or
personal representative may enforce the artist's moral
rights.'88 Some states, such as Massachusetts and New
Mexico, allow even greater protection by allowing
organizations and the attorney general to exercise the artist's
rights in certain circumstances. 8 9
Based on the above, Artist Anne's heirs would fail as
proper claimants in their VARA suit and would be prohibited
from defending her moral rights. 9 ° Yet Artist Anne's heirs
would qualify as proper claimants under the California Act.'
While the university may argue that VARA preempts the
California Act, Artist Anne's heirs are ensured that her rights
under the California Act will sustain a preemption attack and
will be preserved until the fiftieth anniversary of her death.'92
This demonstrates one of the disparate results that a VARA
claim and a state claim may bring.
Martin v. City of Indianapolis also illustrates the
difference between VARA and state statutes.' In that case,
had the City of Indianapolis demolished Martin's sculpture
even one day after his death, Martin's heirs would have
lacked standing to bring suit against the City,' despite the
fact that all other facts of the case supported a clear-cut win
under VARA. 98

185. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).
186. See, e.g., 1120 Ave. of the Ares. Assoc., 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995);
Choe v. Fordham Univ. Sch. of Law, 920 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
187. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1), (g)(1) (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
188. See id.
189. See Damich, supra note 12, at 319-20 n.140.
190. See supra note 182.
191. See supra note 187.
192. See supra notes 182-183 and accompanying text.
193. See Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
194. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
195. See Martin, 192 F.3d at 608.
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B.

Subject Matter Protected
For purposes of this analysis, assume that Artist Anne's
heirs have standing to bring a suit under VARA. Their next
task is establishing that the university's copy of "The Sea" is
a work covered under VARA. Case law indicates that courts
strictly construe the subject matter protected by VARA and
are wary of attributing new meaning to it. 9 ' The facts
surrounding Pavia v. 1120 Avenue of the Americas Associates
support this point.'97 Thus, a court here would likely find that
"The Sea" falls outside of a "work of visual art" protected by
VARA because it was produced in a number of copies
was not consecutively numbered
exceeding two hundred and
198
as required for protection.

Artist Anne's heirs have a greater likelihood of
establishing that "The Sea" is a work protected by the
California Act. The California Act protects "fine art," which
includes "an original painting.., of recognized quality, and of
substantial public interest."' Unlike VARA, it does not place
restrictions upon the number of copies that may qualify a
work as "original" or require consecutive numbering."' Artist
Anne's heirs may establish that "The Sea" is of "recognized
quality" and "substantial public interest" based on any
opinions of those in the art community. 0
While some have criticized the requirements placed on
the subject matter protected by states,2 such requirements
are arguably needed in order to avoid actions being brought
for what has been called "schlock" art.0 3 As one commentator
asked, "Should there be a cause of action for the destruction
of a painting of Elvis Presley on black velvet?"0 4 It should
also be pointed out that while some states, such as California,
196. See, e.g., Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Prods., Inc., 1992 WL 168836, at *4
(N.D. Ill., July 13, 1992) ("We will not read into VARA that which Congress has
evidently chosen to leave out, for, having included extensive categories of works
that do or do not constitute 'visual art,' Congress could have included works
such as puppets, costumes and sets if it desired to afford them the protections of
Section 106A.").
197. See Pavia, 901 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
198. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996 & Supp. 2000).
199. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
200. See id.
201. See id. § 987(f).
202. See Damich, supra note 12, at 297.
203. See id.
204. See id.
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are much more specific about what types of art are eligible for
moral rights' protection," °5 other states opt for a more general
definition of the visual and graphic arts protected.0 6 Such
states allow even greater flexibility into determining what
types of art may be protected. For example, Massachusetts
has been recognized as providing the most comprehensive
coverage of subject matter, which includes its protection of
motion pictures that VARA expressly excludes from
protection.0 7
C.

Rights Granted
For the purposes of this analysis, further assume that
Artist Anne's heirs have standing to bring a suit under VARA
and that the university's copy of "The Sea" falls under the
subject matter covered by VARA. VARA still requires that
Artist Anne's heirs establish that the university violated one
of her moral rights.0 8 They would either have to show that
the university intentionally modified their copy of "The Sea"
in violation of Artist Anne's right of integrity,"' or qualify the
damage to "The Sea" as "destruction," which would require
them to show that the university was grossly negligent. 10
Although the facts of the hypothetical are limited, it will
likely be difficult for Artist Anne's heirs to prove that the
university intentionally modified "The Sea" because the
university may claim mere negligence in their attempts to
restore the painting. 1' Likewise, it may be difficult for Artist
Anne's heirs to establish that the damage to "The Sea"
constituted "destruction," particularly since the university
still sought to display the painting.
Artist Anne's heirs have a greater chance of establishing
a violation of Artist Anne's right of integrity under the
California Act. The California Act prohibits those who
restore a work of fine art from mutilating or altering the work
by any act constituting gross negligence, 12 which it defines as
205. See id. at 298.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 298 n.38.
208. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (1996).
209. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
210. See Damich, supra note 12, at 313-17.
211. The university would make this argument because even by conceding
negligence, the "grossly negligent" standard required for a violation would not
be satisfied. See Damich, supranote 12, at 313-17.
212. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
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"the exercise of so slight a degree of care as to justify the
belief that there was an indifference to the particular work of
fine art. " 13 Based on this standard, Artist Anne's heirs would
arguably have an easier time establishing that the university
was grossly negligent in restoring "The Sea."
It is important to note that preemption is a particular
concern in the area of rights granted. Although the Senate
narrowed the reach of VARA's preemption,214 the House
stated that "if a State attempts to grant an author the rights
of attribution or integrity for works of visual art as defined in
[VARA], those laws will be preempted."2 15 This demonstrates
the importance of states carefully defining the moral rights
sought to be protected in order to avoid duplicating the
definitions contained in VARA.
It is also important to note that states may grant rights
that are beyond those protected in VARA.216 Specifically,
Congress stated that sections such as § 989 of the California
Act, which grants rights beyond those provided by VARA
aimed at art preservation, will not be preempted.21 7
D. Remedies
Finally, assuming that Artist Anne's heirs have satisfied
the elements of a successful VARA claim, their remedies will
Although VARA provides for actual
likely be limited.
damages," ' it is often difficult for artists to establish actual
damage to their reputation.2"9 And while Artist Anne's heirs
may recover statutory damages as provided by VARA, which
is limited to a maximum amount of $20,000,220 they may not
recover enhanced damages without proving that the
university's act was "willful."2 1 Establishing "willful" conduct
brings its own host of difficulties since the artist must
produce evidence that the defendant knew or had reason to

213. Id.
214. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).
215. See H.R. REP. No. 101-514 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6915.
216. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).
217. See id.
218. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (1996 & Supp. 2000).
219. See, e.g., Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (granting plaintiff $1 in actual damages under New York's
Authorship Act because he failed to establish actual harm to his reputation).
220. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).
221. See id. § 504(c)(2).
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know that the work was protected by copyright law.222
Artist Anne's heirs may be able to recover attorneys' fees
and costs under VARA,22 yet in the one case that has granted
such a remedy, the court felt compelled to justify its award. 24
It further justified granting the fees in order to "encourage
artists to assert their VARA rights in court and to deter...
destroying works of art in future [situations]."225

While Artist Anne's heirs may face the same problems in
recovering remedies under the California Act, the California
Act grants damages not provided for in VARA, namely,
2 6
punitive damages.1

The California Act provides that if

punitive damages are awarded, the court shall "select an
organization or organizations engaged in charitable or
educational activities involving the fine arts in California to
receive any punitive damages." 7 Although the punitive
damages are allocated to a charitable organization rather
than to the artist herself, it can be argued that the granting
of punitive damages itself sends a message to would-be
violators of artists' moral rights that the state recognizes such
violations as seriously worthy of protection. If one accepts the
logic that granting attorneys' fees and costs encourages other
artists to assert their rights and sends a message that works
of art deserve preservation and respect, 28 then granting
punitive rights can only further drive home this message.
Martin v. City of Indianapolis again helpfully
demonstrates the difference between VARA and state
statutes." 9 Had the facts of Martin occurred in California and
a concurrent claim was brought under the California Act, the
artist in Martin would have recovered an amount greater
than the statutory damages and attorneys fees awarded to
him. Nevertheless, Indiana had no law protecting artists'
moral rights and Martin's recovery was limited to those
granted under VARA.2 °
222. See id.
223. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1996 & Supp. 2000).
224. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing the
statutory damages award as insufficient compensation for the loss of the artist's
work and explaining that the issues involved were neither new nor complex).
225. BNA Patent, Trademark & Copyright Law Daily, dated June 24, 1998.
226. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(e)(3) (West 1982 & Supp. 1999).
227. Id.
228. See supra note 223.
229. Martin, 192 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 1999).
230. See id.

20001
E.

VISUAL ARTISTS" MORAL RIGHTS

227

Summary of Comparison

In sum, the VARA claim brought by Artist Anne's heirs
would have been dismissed for several reasons. Not only
would Artist Anne's heirs have failed to satisfy standing to
sue based on the duration of rights terminating with the life
of the author,23 ' but they would have failed to establish that
"The Sea" was a "work of visual art" protected under VARA. 32
Artist Anne's heirs would have also likely failed to convince
the court that the university's act of damaging "The Sea"
violated any rights under VARA. 33 Finally, even if Artist
Anne's heirs had succeeded in their VARA claim, their
remedies would have been limited.3 4
Quite differently, the California Act claim brought by
Artist Anne's heirs would have been allowed. First, Artist
Anne's heirs could satisfy standing based on the survivorship
rights that the California Act provides.2 35

They could then

establish that "The Sea" was a work of "fine art" protected
under the California Act"6 and that the university's act of
harming the painting and then improperly displaying it
constituted violations of Artist Anne's right of integrity.3
And finally, Artist Anne's heirs would have been eligible to
recover greater damages than those provided by VARA,
possibly including punitive damages.2 8
Finally, this analysis would not be complete without
addressing the argument that these state statutes create an
uneven patchwork of varying rules and protections that
defeat the uniformity that VARA sought to establish.3 9
However, this argument is easily addressed by pointing to
case law brought under VARA, which indicates that because
VARA is so narrowly applied, it fails to establish a
comprehensive set of uniform standards and protections. 4 °
Rather, as some commentators have already pointed out,
VARA acts as a minimum threshold of protection,241 which is
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.D.
See supra Part V.A.
See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part IV.C.
See supra Part IV.D.
See Cline, supra note 12; see also Damich, supra note 12.
See supra Part II.C.
See Zlatarski, supra note 35, at 222.
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consistent with Congress's "minimalist approach" to
recognizing moral rights even prior to VARA's enactment.""
V. PROPOSAL
Despite the fact that both VARA and the California Act
serve to protect artists' moral rights, the results of the
hypothetical are largely disparate. Yet, one begins to quickly
understand the differences that a VARA claim and a claim
under a state statute may produce. One also begins to
understand the need for states to pass statutes that protect
artists' moral rights. For without state protection, artists are
left with the minimum threshold of protection that VARA
provides. Thus, this comment urges states to pass legislation
that protects artists' moral rights in order to supplement the
protections afforded by VARA.
In the area of duration, states should consider complying
with the Berne Convention by extending the duration of
protections to the life of the artist plus fifty years,4 3 and
allowing an artist's heirs, legatees or personal representatives
standing to bring suit. 4
California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, and New Mexico are all examples of such
coverage. ' The policy supporting this duration of protections
is strong in that it is expressly backed by Congress.4 6 While
Congress was safe in saying that it did not require states to
extend moral rights past the death of the artist,4 7 it did
provide that VARA would allow states to provide such
extended coverage.4 8 An additional policy argument lies
behind the argument that often artists' works are not
recognized by the public until after their death, or perhaps
even gain an elevated status after their death. Thus, the
ability of an artist's heirs or personal representatives to
preserve the artist's integrity in the work of art after his or
her death becomes even more important.
242. See VerSteeg, supra note 37, at 832.
243. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works,
March 20, 1914, U.S., art. 6bis, S. TREATY DOC. No. 99-27 (1986).
244. See id.
245. See CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1999); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 42-116s-t (West 1992 & Supp. 1998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, §
85S (West 1986 & Supp. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B (Michie 1997).
246. See supra Part IV.A.
247. See 136 CONG. REC. 36,948 (1990).
248. See id.
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Another way in which states may supplement VARA's
protections is by protecting as broad a scope of work as
possible.
This would not only better protect artists in
compliance with the Berne Convention, but also act as a net
in "catching" those cases that are exempt from VARA's
narrow subject matter protected. Massachusetts is a good
role model, as it has been recognized as providing the most
comprehensive coverage of subject matter, which includes its
protection of motion pictures that VARA expressly excludes
from protection. 49
States must be cautious in creating the moral rights to be
protected, especially so as to avoid preemption by VARA.
Here, the California Act is a good role model for the right of
integrity, as it has been praised for allowing artists to object
to any modification of their work, including those that
enhanced
her reputation or those that were not attributed to
2 50
her.
Finally, states may supplement the protections of VARA
by expanding the remedies to include punitive damages. The
California Act is a good example of one of the ways that states
may allow for such damages.5 1 The same policy behind the
Martin court's rationale for granting attorneys' fees and costs
to the artist lies behind allowing punitive damages, namely,
to encourage artists to assert their moral rights in court and
to deter modifications and destruction of works of art in the
future.252
With the passage of VARA, many of the states'
justifications for withholding from enacting statutes no longer
exist. While state statutes would ideally conform to the
standards detailed above, artists would likely benefit from
any state statutes as opposed to no state statutes at all. Even
those states with existing statutes protecting artists' moral
rights should consider the above modifications in order to
better protect their artists by supplementing the protections
of VARA.

249. See Damich, supra note 12, at 298 n.38.
250. See Edward J. Damich, Moral Rights in the United States and Article
6bis of the Berne Convention: A Comment on the PreliminaryReport of the Ad
Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA
J.L. 655, 661 (1986).
251. See supra Part IV.D.
252. See supra note 223.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The doctrine of moral rights serves the noble purpose of
protecting artists' personality rights in their works of art that
they share with the world.25 For example, when one sees a
painting of a can of Campbell's tomato soup, one is instantly
reminded of Andy Warhol. However, if one were to see a
painting of a can of Campbell's tomato soup with the words
"Fat Free," one would likely become confused and question
why Andy Warhol would alter his work in such a way. By
allowing artists to protect their personality rights embodied
in their works of art, the doctrine of moral rights stimulates
artists' creativity, which then benefits the public who enjoys
the artists' works.254
The doctrine of moral rights is finally coming of age in
the United States. Congress's decision to enact VARA was a
step in the right direction, yet as case law has shown its
limitations and narrow application prohibit it from more
In
substantially protecting artists' moral rights.255
comparison, some state statutes fare more favorably because
they can protect artists in ways that VARA does not.256 They
not only better protect artists' moral rights, but also have the
added flexibility of being able to further protect such rights.257
Accordingly, this comment urges states to enact such statutes
as a means of better protecting artists by supplementing the
limited protections of VARA.
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